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Postmodern political values: pluralism and legitimacy 
in the thought of John Rawls and Gianni Vattimo 
The pro tanto values of political legitimation 
 
The difference between traditional liberal political positions and their postmodern 
counterparts – that is, to be bellicose, between the commitment to the moral reality of 
liberty and equality and the affirmation of the weakening of metaphysical foundations 
– oddly does not lie in the political or ethical attachment to the values of liberty and 
equality themselves.  Neither does it seem that the almost already passé conflict 
between liberalism and communitarianism rests upon a disagreement over those 
values one finds embodied in the political structures and institutions of the West.  For 
all three of these ideal characters will affirm – when pushed – the desirability of the 
political values of liberty and equality over, say, those of harmony, order or natural 
hierarchy and also claim that a society which does not embody the values of liberty 
and equality is worse than one which does.  Where these positions come apart is in the 
justification of these values and their consequent normative commitments. 
 
When one offers reasons for the rationality of a law or the existence of a particular 
institution, one normally invokes certain pro tanto political values shared by all 
agents: equality, liberty, respect, and so on.  So, when the government imposes new 
employment regulations concerning the use of data in job application procedures, the 
reasons can be reduced to values we all share which stand in a rational relation to the 
new legal requirements: so, one must not ask for age, race or creed information prior 
to the interviewing process in order to ensure that all applicants are treated equally 
and no irrelevant factors influence the decision of the recruitment panel.  At base is 
the commitment to the claim that all members of society have the liberty to pursue 
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their chosen goals no matter their colour, creed or any other morally irrelevant factors.  
The values are termed pro tanto in the sense that, at a level below philosophical 
reflection, (1) they are operative in the everyday practical reasoning of the agent, (2) 
they are immediate and not in need of explicit justification, (3) they motivate the 
agent over and above contingent desires, and yet, (4) can be violated if circumstances 
are exceptional.  Within and among liberal societies, there may, of course, be 
disagreements over the relations between these and their various hierarchies, but not 
on the validity of the central political values themselves.  However, when one asks 
why these values and not, as Plato might have held, order, symmetry, power, and so 
on, then the various theoretical positions will begin to separate.   
 
The main distinction that interests me here concerns legitimating practices.  When one 
is forced on to the philosophical level of justifying our pro tanto values over and 
above other alternatives, theories separate into, one, those that view these values as 
universal (derived from reciprocity, autonomy, or a prior principle such as the 
categorical imperative or the principle of utility) and, two, those that see them as 
derivable from the tradition and political culture of the agent.  For the liberal, these 
political values are universal moral values which exist independently of any particular 
society and can measure the justness of a particular policy or institution.  The 
alternative is to implicitly affirm the social thesis: the individual is only who she is by 
virtue of the tradition which brought her into being and maintains and promotes her 
identity.  The problem with this position is, of course, relativism: it seems to be 
descriptive rather than normative and liberalism’s advantage, especially in its 
traditional form, is that, as a comprehensive doctrine, it will support and promote the 
pro tanto political values since they coincide with its description of ‘true’ 
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metaphysical reality.  If human beings are able to use their reason free from coercion, 
then they would accept the political values of liberalism as true and its vision of 
society as just and fair. 
 
However, such a justification relies on the metaphysical position of moral realism or, 
at the least, a universal coherentism, and it was the uneasiness at committing to this 
justification in terms of truth that motivates Rawls’s transition from, arguably, 
comprehensive liberalism in A Theory of Justice to his later political liberalism.  As 
he often states: under free institutions, the only way to affirm a comprehensive 
doctrine is to impose it on citizens and that would be a violation of liberalism’s 
central principles.  (Rawls, 1993, IV) 
 
Of course, there exists the putative assumption that, since these values are liberal 
values, the most coherent form of justification must be a liberal one.  The aim of this 
article is to unravel the foundations of this assumption and, in doing so, to 
demonstrate that the transition from comprehensive to political liberalism is an 
expression of postmodern concerns at the heart of liberalism.  The central claim of the 
first section will be familiar and seeks only to set the problem: John Rawls's 
reorientation of political philosophy from problems of justice to problems of 
legitimacy either does not solve the motivational problems of political action unless 
he abandons his Kantian account of the person for a commitment to the social thesis. 
(§2)  The novel content of this article concerns the interrogation of Gianni Vattimo's 
hermeneutical liberalism to demonstrate how the commitment to the social thesis, so 
offensive to the majority of liberals, can offer a plausible account of political 
motivation congruent with the demands of legitimacy.  But, it must also be committed 
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to a minimal formal account of practical reason much to the chagrin of the critics of 
postmodern ethics who accuse all contextual thought of exhibiting strong irrational 
tendencies. (§3)  The intention of the conclusion is to show that whether one begins 
from the liberal commitment to formal values, or the postmodern contextual 
commitment to substantive, situated values, one must be committed to a political form 
of autonomy which is both non-comprehensive and necessarily situated.  Moreover, 
the recognition of these concerns necessitates a simultaneous avowal of postmodern 
themes in order for political liberalism to be fully coherent and persuasive as a 
political doctrine, as well as an explicit recognition of the formal claims of reason by 
any postmodern thought. (§4)   
From comprehensive to political liberalism 
 
Rawls’s transition from the position he entertained in A Theory of Justice to Political 
Liberalism still remains an object of considerable disquiet and unease for many of his 
liberal supporters.  The main point of contention seemed to be that he had paid too 
much heed to his communitarian critics and made too great a concession to the social 
thesis. (Hampton, 1989; Steinberger, 2000; Wenar, 1995; cf. Krasnoff, 1998)1  The 
worry centres on his clear demarcation between two realms of values: the 
comprehensive and the political.  The former justifies values in terms of what is of 
value to human life as determined by a background context of religious, ethical and 
metaphysical commitments on the part of the agent.  Contrastingly, political values 
are limited in their scope, being applicable only to debates about the basic structure of 
society, and are freestanding, in that they can be presented independently of any 
comprehensive doctrine and justified with reference to a shared public culture.  
(Rawls, 1998, I: §2; 1999a; 1999b)  It is commonly held that the major factor 
motivating Rawls’s new position was the communitarian critique, yet there was 
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perhaps a more influential reason that compelled the shift in emphasis: the rephrasing 
of the political question from a concern with justice to a concern with legitimacy. 
Most liberal detractors of the new Rawls were mostly – and overtly – concerned with 
the former of these two factors, but it is the second which best expresses the 
‘postmodern’ concerns of political liberalism and is, arguably, of greater significance.  
(Dreben, 2003) 
 
An uncritical description of the main characteristics of political liberalism would be 
that it respects each citizen’s freedom and equality as reasonable and rational in that 
state power is only to be used in ways all citizens might reasonably be expected to 
endorse.  This embodies the central claim of liberal legitimacy for Rawls, yet he 
realizes, given the fact of pluralism, the use of state power cannot be justified by a 
comprehensive doctrine. (Rawls, 1999c, 412)  Rather, the legitimacy of the organs 
and institutions of power is derived from an appeal to the values and ideas of public 
reason and these political values are supported by an overlapping consensus of 
comprehensive doctrines likely to provide the foundations for a stable and enduring 
society. (Rawls, 2001, §11.1)  Rawls, here, is embodying a central characteristic of 
liberal political theory into his new account.  Free institutions give rise to a pluralism 
of comprehensive doctrines due to the burdens of judgements, which is the fact that 
practical reason is unable to definitely decide matters of ethical import and of a 
political nature. (Rawls, 1993, II:2)  In consequence, there will be disagreements over 
the central values and a continuity of shared adherence to a single comprehensive 
doctrine, including a comprehensive liberal one, can only be maintained by the 
oppressive use of state power (the fact of oppression).  And such use of state power 
would be in direct violation of central liberal commitments. 
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So far, so familiar; but how does the distinction between political and comprehensive 
values allow Rawls to respond to the most damaging of the communitarian critiques?  
One of the most significant charges, and the one of most interest here, laid at the door 
of A Theory of Justice was that it is metaphysically incoherent.  The self of the 
original position is perceived as the ideal rational agent because the procedure 
guarantees impartiality since the self is freed from the entanglements of social 
relationships and detached from any constitutive adherence to the good.  But, such an 
agent has no moral depth and it is difficult to see how one can be motivated to do 
what the rational device prescribes unless one is secretly proposing a form of Kantian 
‘duty for duty’s sake.’ (Hegel, 1991, §135R)  On such a model, duty just is different 
in kind to other motivations.  Persons, however, are constituted by social goods and 
motivated by elements of their full, comprehensive identities, social entanglements 
and personal commitments.  It makes little metaphysical sense to posit a rational self 
in an ideal position as the deciding vote in cases of political and ethical reasoning. 
(Sandel, 1998, ch. 1)   
 
Rawls believes that his restatement of political subjectivity within the theory of 
political liberalism is able to evade the charge of metaphysical incoherence because 
he does not fully detach the political subject from comprehensive commitments.  
Liberty and equality are motivating for the particular agent because he or she adheres 
to a comprehensive doctrine that views these values as substantive goods, but as 
substantive goods they cannot play the role of justifying reasons to other participants 
in the political arena who, given the fact of pluralism, may not share his or her 
comprehensive doctrine.  As a particular agent, one is committed to a substantive 
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account of the good, whereas as a political agent, one is committed to agreement on 
the basis of freestanding, political values which accord with one’s comprehensive 
doctrine.  The values of the agent are justified in a three-fold way.  First, from a 
psychological point of view, these values are seemingly axiomatic pro tanto values 
with compelling weight belonging to the public reason of his or her society.2  Yet, this 
means that they are not necessarily motivating since they are only valuable in public 
and not a private sense, that is divorced from the agent qua particular agent.  
Therefore, these political values need also to coincide with substantive commitments 
of the agent, those values derived from his or her comprehensive doctrine (one’s 
identity); thus, they are seen as a good and can motivate action and allegiance. 
(Rawls, 1999b, 473fn)  However, it is feasible to assume that certain political values 
(equality) conflict with comprehensive ones (filial loyalty).  In cases such as these 
Rawls wants to hold that the values of public reason ought to have greater weight than 
those of the comprehensive doctrine, but he needs to explain why as a political agent I 
see the equality of fair opportunity as prior to my considered moral judgements, as a 
private individual, that my son really needs a career and there is a vacancy in my 
company.  Rawls’s response becomes pertinent below, and we shall return to it in due 
course, but let us merely indicate the shape it takes: these political values demand 
obedience because these values can form a stable overlapping consensus amongst 
diverse groups which will sustain an enduring society and members of such groups 
will come to see this as a good if they are brought up under such institutions. 
 
Whatever the influence of communitarianism on Rawls’s thinking, the possibility to 
respond to these criticisms is perhaps a mere side effect of a deeper change in the 
orientation of his thought; from justice to legitimacy.  The communitarian critiques 
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probably only served to refocus Rawls’s question rather than reformulate his possible 
answers.  What is truly at stake in Political Liberalism is the issue of when the power 
of the state can legitimately be used: sanction and coercion are legitimate when they 
can be rationally justified to all citizens.  However, if one is to fully endorse the 
position of political liberalism, then there is no real rational preference for the liberal 
way of life over others.  The pro tanto values of liberty and equality are political 
values which legitimate coercion and sanction because, in our society, they belong to 
the values of our public reason; that is to say, they are capable of forming the basis for 
a stable and enduring overlapping consensus of various comprehensive doctrines.  So, 
when a law or policy is imposed on citizens, its legitimacy rests upon its consistency 
with certain unreflectively endorsed values, most notably liberty and equality.  
Liberty and equality are pre-philosophically compelling reasons for all citizens in a 
liberal state and constituent of a shared axiological fabric.  Yet, whereas one citizen 
may hold these values because he is a Christian, another will do so because she is a 
Muslim.  And others will holds them because they are Kantians, utilitarians and so on.  
Hence, the pre-philosophically shared pro tanto values are grounded in a pluralism of 
metaphysical, philosophical and religious commitments that are not necessarily 
coherent at a deeper level.  However, it would not be impossible to imagine the 
alternative pro tanto values of, say, harmony and order also forming a stable and 
enduring overlapping consensus for a different society (understood as an historical 
and geographical development) grounded in diverse metaphysical theories (Platonism, 
Aristotelianism, Stoicism, Sophism, Epicureanism, Paganism and so on).  And this is 
a possibility which Rawls admits. (Rawls, 1999d) 
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The tension which inhabits Rawls’s statement of political liberalism needs to be made 
explicit with reference to his robust claim that when comprehensive values and 
political values conflict, it is the latter which ought to be privileged.  So, if the 
commitments of one’s religion conflicted with the commitments of public reason, the 
latter outweigh the former.  Yet, the second level of justification of value was 
introduced in order to show how agents could be committed to the right since it 
derived from and accorded with substantive beliefs and values of their particular 
comprehensive doctrine.  The problem of conflict seems to reverse this order of 
explanation and puts into question the motivational power of political values. 
 
Why would Rawls hold that political values outweigh comprehensive ones?  This 
question concerns two separate issues: what motivates Rawls and what the exact 
nature of political value is.  The motivation is simple enough to understand: 
expediency.  Laws need to be endorsed over and above particular or group 
commitments of the individual otherwise the structure of society itself will become 
unstable when conflict arises.  Society is an arena for the resolution of conflict, not 
the suppression of it.  The description of the nature of political values that enables 
them, even if they are non-metaphysical, to trump comprehensive one is, however, 
more difficult to understand and involves two aspects.  One, political values are very 
great values indeed and they are not easily overridden; and two, political values form 
an overlapping consensus that will endure over time. (Rawls, 1993, IV: §1)  The 
relationship between these two features of political values is that the greatness of 
these values pre-exists their capacity to form an overlapping consensus and, as such, 
Rawls can deny that he is guilty of introducing the social thesis into liberal thought.  
Political values constitute a coherent view of the values which each particular agent 
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brings into political participation.  If one is reasonable, that is committed to mutual 
and reciprocal agreement, then one will recognize the role of liberal values in 
constraining permissible ideas of the good and, more significantly, making possible 
and sustaining ways of life that citizens can affirm as worthwhile.  
 
The distinction between the political and the comprehensive is, however, keenly felt 
when the subject is torn between values.  Take the example of these two principles: I 
believe I ought to do the best for my family and I believe that employment positions 
ought to be distributed with due concern for fair equality of opportunity.  Then, my 
son applies for a vacancy in my company for which he is not the best candidate. The 
conception of the good that immediately motivates me is that I should do the best for 
my son, derived from my personal commitments, identity and social entanglements.  
However, Rawls holds that the political values will have greater weight than the 
comprehensive ones because the values of liberty, respect, equality, et al, constitute a 
very great public good.    So, the notion of the right, in itself, cannot motivate unless it 
coincides with goods that outweigh my egoism or filial loyalty: the need to keep the 
peace, the need for a stable society, the need for me to be treated fairly in the future, 
and so on.  Only in such a manner can we avoid the curious Kantian duty for duty's 
sake.   
 
Let us reflect a little more deeply on what exactly is at stake here.  When the 
communitarians criticized the unencumbered self of the original position, Rawls was 
at pains to stress it was a mere rational construct.  The claim that the rational subject 
is able to forgo personal commitments for the sake of very great values indeed, that is 
political ones, exacerbates the odd Kantian psychology implicit in Rawls’s earlier 
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work unless he can show that political values are privileged in the practical reason of 
the individual since the formal values of liberalism are also substantive goods which 
demand allegiance from subjects belonging to a liberal way of life. (Rawls, 1999b, 
487)  And here the full problem comes into view.  The explanation of why these 
political values are goods can take three forms.  One, the historical development of 
liberalism has generated a way of life in which the citizens of liberal democracies feel 
at home and find their identity.  However, if Rawls embraces this option, then it is an 
avowal of the social thesis and the values of liberty and equality are right for us, but 
not transcendentally (to our culture) so.  Two, Rawls often hints at the good of 
stability.  Our society is able to form an overlapping consensus that will endure over 
time and a stable society is a good society.  So, the values of liberty and equality are 
justified in terms of a new value: stability.  However, this is problematic for two 
reasons: first, the political arena seemingly becomes a sphere of compromise and this 
is explicitly what Rawls did not want and, second, oppressive regimes (as Hobbes 
well knew) can be extremely stable but are still not desirable societies, so a society 
cannot be merely stable but its stability has to be grounded in those values a 
reasonable citizen might endorse. (Rawls, 1999e, 432)  Three, in consequence,  Rawls 
may want to assert that not only is our society stable, but it is stable for the right 
reasons.  Such an assertion would rule out the problems with the Hobbesian account 
of stability above, but this opens Rawls up to a charge circularity since stability for 
the right reasons seems to be a stability founded on free and equal citizens and, more 
significantly, political liberalism becomes to resemble a comprehensive doctrine and 
will only be enforceable through coercion. (Wingenbach, 1999, 221-2)3 
 
  748d7fca-e5a7-44d0-9c25-99079c3d9c65-2  12 of 29      
The choice is, then, either to admit that political liberalism commits one to an 
acceptance of the social thesis and hence one is unable to easily argue that liberty and 
equality are intrinsically more valuable than harmony and order; or one can offer a 
justification of the values of liberty and equality independent of a particular politico-
historical tradition, but this is seemingly a comprehensive doctrine and will lead to 
coercion given the fact of oppression.  Rawls's neat division of the historical origin of 
liberalism (the Wars of Religion) from the qualitative worth of its values is not as 
insignificant to his argument as is commonly held and plays a fundamental role in the 
relationship between the political and the embedded self with relation to practical 
reasoning. (Rawls, 1993, introduction)  The social and material conditions of 
contemporary culture, that is the political context of liberal constitutional democracy 
with its irresistible tendency to value pluralism, the rational egalitarianism of post-
Reformation thought and the inherent social individualism of capitalism, require a 
practically efficacious and theoretically compelling account of political legitimation 
derived from a shared value system.  And only if it acknowledges the historical origin 
of these values, can political liberalism evade the charge of metaphysical incoherence 
concerning the rational psychology of the agent.   
 
We ought then to look at an account of postmodern reason which begins from rather 
than reaches this point.   Any subject who seeks to legitimate a political judgement 
must appeal to the substantive social goods of his or her contextual identity, which – 
in our case – just happen to be liberty and equality, et cetera.  Rawls, and most 
liberals, are loathe to do so since the problem of normativity returns: although our 
values can be rational to us within a specific tradition, there is no universal 
justification to export or compare them to values of other, alien cultures.  One is 
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forced to remain silent in the face of practices such as ritualistic human sacrifice and 
female circumcision, since although they violate liberty and equality, it may be the 
case that divine obedience belongs to the public reason of the other culture.  
Postmodern thought needs to aspire to be more than a mere descriptive genealogy of 
values and show why the rational agent ought to be committed to the values of 
political liberalism over and above those of other cultures. 
Vattimo’s ethics of interpretation and the rational postmodern 
 
Vattimo’s ethics of interpretation is an attempt to offer a minimally rational position 
consistent with truth as interpretation.   The dual faceted nature of value judgements, 
in that they are seemingly both practical and rational has underpinned various modern 
attitudes. The tenor of scientific rationalism has been to deny the rational nature of 
such statements; when I state that ‘killing is wrong’ or ‘that is beautiful’ all I am 
doing is expressing an attitude I have towards the object in question.  Facts are 
epistemologically ‘higher’ than values since the latter are not truth-apt as they express 
mere interests and preferences. Much postmodern thought is concerned with 
undermining this dichotomy by demonstrating that knowledge, too, is an expression 
of human interests and group preferences. (Bauman, 1993)  The central and repeated 
claim of Vattimo’s thought is that once one realizes that there is no interest-free view 
from nowhere, then one is liberated from the constraints of inauthentic existence. 
(Rose, 2002)  However, this distributes truth and objectivity on the same epistemic 
stratum as interpretation and it seems that constraints on ways of life fade away, 
seemingly leaving an anarchic play of power between groups and individuals in the 
political sphere: there is no reason to accept one’s own values or the values of others 
in any sense other than arbitrariness and pure wilfulness.4  Vattimo attempts, 
however, to demonstrate that some interpretations are, in some sense, better than 
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others.  So, instead of facts being levelled down to the status of preferences and 
interests, values are levelled up to the status of facts. The commitment to the 
responsibility of interpretation and the need for a reflective relation between the 
historical subject and his or her tradition resolves itself into a position which shares 
many of the features of political liberalism and yet, I argue, offers a way to mitigate 
its central tension. 
 
There seemingly exists an immediate parallel between Rawls and Vattimo which is, 
however, deceptive: the pluralism of contemporary society.  The nature of their 
respective pluralisms is different though.  For Rawls, it is a consequence of his radical 
empiricism: under free institutions people are able to form their own conceptions of 
the good and, given the burdens of judgement, it is nigh on impossible that there will 
be decided resolution of, and highly improbable that there will even be homogeneous 
agreement on, the substantive goods of a human life.  One may understand this as 
pluralism by default; one is agnostic about the metaphysical existence of one true 
good, but given the limits of reason, it is unlikely – even if there were such a thing – 
men would be able to cognize it and communicate it to others.  For Vattimo, on the 
other hand, the metaphysics that underpins the belief in a unitary and universal good 
for all corrupts free thinking by privileging the subject-object relation as the locus of 
truth.  Knowledge is, by its nature, a contextual enterprise and cannot be otherwise: 
There are no transcendental conditions of possibility for 
experience which might be attainable through some 
type of reduction or epoché suspending our ties to 
historical-cultural, linguistic, categorical horizons.  The 
conditions of possibility for experience are always 
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qualified…  The foundation, the beginning, the initial 
transmission of our discourse cannot, in other words, 
but be a hermeneutic foundation. (Vattimo, 1984, 152) 
Due to the multiplication of perspectives and the emergence of isolated and 
fragmented histories, there is no longer one reality to represent but many depending 
on those interests expressed in the knowledge discourse: the truth of the Proletarian 
class, of the West, of white males and so on.  The assumption that there is but one 
truth and but one method or discourse adequate to its representation has been 
weakened leaving no discourse in a privileged position. 
 
The distinction which motivates the two presentations of pluralism has significant 
consequences, nicely brought out if one considers another central normative 
commitment of liberalism, namely tolerance.  Tolerance, for Rawls, as we have seen, 
is born from a necessity to avoid suffering and war in Europe when the people had 
come to the conclusion that it was unlikely there would ever be any incontrovertible 
agreement on theological doctrine. (Rawls, 1993, introduction)  Conflict over 
comprehensive doctrines is a brute fact of human existence and tolerance is one 
particular historical response to this problem.  The value of tolerance, over 
generations, then becomes a very great value indeed and occupies a privileged 
position in the practical reasoning of the subject born and educated under liberal 
institutions (whether he or she be Muslim, Christian or Jew.)  For Vattimo, however, 
since pluralism is not an empirical condition but a transcendental condition of 
knowledge, tolerance is, then, an a priori normative requirement for free and sincere 
thinking.  If this is so, then to say tolerance occupies a special place in practical 
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reasoning is no longer required.  Once one reflects, one is being tolerant.  If one is 
intolerant, one is in error. 
 
The goal, then, of Vattimo’s ethics of interpretation is to show that liberal political 
values have a privileged role in the subject’s practical reason because when one 
reflects, one seeks to legitimate the ground of one’s comprehensive commitments to 
others and, hence, one must be committed to avoiding error.  Over and above 
tolerance, one must also recognize and be aware of the contextual, embedded nature 
of one’s identity: 
The .main feature of an ethics of this kind is that it takes 
a ‘step backward,’ takes its distance from the choices 
and concrete options that are directly imposed by the 
situation. (Vattimo, 2004, 41) 
This is the recognition that those motivations and values which impinge on the 
agent’s practical reason in a concrete situation must be put into question in order to 
ensure both their validity and relevance to the matter in hand.  The step back is the 
disentanglement of the moral self from the particular self achieved in liberalism by 
the divorce of the universal from the contingent. One famous way to achieve this is 
the heuristic device of the original position, of course.  (Rawls, 1971, part 1)  
However, the second characteristic of Vattimo’s ethics is the avowal that such a step 
back is not to some prior nor privileged (one might say, ‘original’) epistemic or moral 
position; thus, avoiding the reintroduction of the Kantian motivation schism.  Ethics 
cannot – as communitarianism reminds liberalism – prescribe from the void.  The 
subject of liberalism is unencumbered and hence rationality is replaced by the 
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affirmation of mere preferences or partial interests.  The stepping back, for Vattimo, is 
not a denial of finitude: 
An ethics of finitude tries to keep faith with the 
discovery that one’s own provenance is ‘located,’ in a 
way always and insuperably finite, without forgetting 
the pluralistic implications of this discovery.  I go to 
church with the saints, and to the tavern with the ‘guys’, 
as we say in Italian, and I can never delude myself that I 
am really standing somewhere else, somewhere loftier.  
Even as I am writing this philosophical paper, I am 
merely in another condition, which imposes certain 
obligations on me like any other: the particular 
condition of the philosopher, essayist, critic, never that 
of Universal Man. (Vattimo, 2004, 44) 
In other words, the situation of the speaker – the voice and its tradition – is equivalent 
to the comprehensive values: it is impossible to negate these values and still make 
substantial political or ethical commitments.  So, liberty, respect, et al, must be both 
formal and substantive: formal in order to make free and open dialogue possible; 
substantive otherwise in cases of conflict between political values and comprehensive 
ones, there is no reason for the former to have greater weight.  Reasonableness is, for 
Rawls, the capacity for a doctrine to conform with the freestanding political values in 
an enduring overlapping consensus, whereas, for Vattimo, reasonable doctrines 
cannot violate the norms of free thinking.  Therefore, for both of them, a universal 
requirement of a doctrine in order to be considered a partner in consensus is respect 
towards the other: 
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Respect for others is, above all, recognition of the 
finitude that characterizes all of us and that rules out 
nay complete conquest of the opacity that every person 
bears. (Vattimo, 2004, 47) 
It is the subject, rather than the doctrine, that is or is not reasonable and the grounding 
norm is one of political autonomy, that is, autonomy independent of any metaphysical 
or comprehensive doctrine.  And the formal requirement of this norm is to treat others 
with respect.  For Vattimo, this respect is grounded in an anti-metaphysical claim: 
truth is plural; whereas for Rawls it is grounded in radical empiricism and the 
consequences of the burdens of judgement. 
 
According to Vattimo, when a comprehensive doctrine justifies political values that 
all agents must accept, it is an instance of the violence of metaphysics: ‘metaphysics 
is violent thinking: the foundation, if it is given in incontrovertible evidence that no 
longer admits further enquiry, is like an authority that keeps things quiet and takes 
control without explanation.’ (Vattimo, 1997, 40)  Such violence is nothing but the 
fact of oppression.  The subject-object relation is only a conditional possibility of 
knowledge if the subject is ethically impartial and epistemologically objective, but, in 
postmodern thought, it is no longer a question of what is said but always who is 
speaking; every pretence at impartiality or objectivity is the hidden and perhaps 
unconscious expression of a group or individual worldview which is but one truth 
amongst many.  But it could not be otherwise.  The anti-metaphysical nature of 
postmodern thought supplies an implicit commitment to political liberalism and 
tolerance in a way that Rawls’s radical empiricism fails to do.  One finds at the heart 
of Vattimo’s endeavour a coincidence between the aspirations of modernity (the 
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refusal of blind obedience to authority) and liberalism (the values of liberty, equality, 
respect and tolerance): 
There is no foundation for subordinating oneself to a 
given and transcendent objective order, nor for 
subordinating oneself to someone who could demand 
obedience in the name of that order alone.  In the world 
without foundations, everyone is equal and the 
imposition of any system of meaning on others is 
violence and oppression, for it can never legitimate 
itself by referring to an objective order.  The only 
possible foundation for the predominance of an order of 
meaning is force. (Vattimo, 1992, 95) 
The absence of the values of political liberalism reduces dialogue to the level of might 
is right where the preferences of those who are more powerful or more violent win 
out.  Thus, it seems there is a universal commitment to liberal political values 
otherwise there is no way to transcendentally rule out force as a valid form of 
legitimacy, and this perhaps explains better why they are very great values indeed.  
Notice, as an overt example, the (very un-Nietzschean) claim that the end of 
metaphysical foundations has the consequence of entailing a commitment on the part 
of the subject to the norm of equality.  So, equality is not brought about as a mere by-
product of the wars of religion, or the imposition of accidental social theories, but is 
written into the very nature of hermeneutic truth: if there is not one truth, then there 
are many truths and yours – as well as mine – is on equal footing.  Without the 
historical emergence of the modern subject, politics is nothing but games of power 
  748d7fca-e5a7-44d0-9c25-99079c3d9c65-2  20 of 29      
between interested groups and individuals.  With the modern subject, politics for the 
first time becomes properly ethical. 
 
Vattimo’s full ethics of interpretation is characterized in this quotation: 
Whether or not they [the rational norms] still hold good 
is something to be decided in light of the criterion that, 
with a responsible interpretation, we take to be 
characteristic of whatever ‘really’ forms part of the 
legacy to which we feel ourselves committed.  If we 
find this criterion in nihilism, in the dissolution of 
ultimate foundations and their universability (the 
violent refusal to have them questioned), then the 
choice between what holds good and what does not in 
the cultural heritage from which we come will be made 
on the basis of the reduction of violence and under the 
sign of rationality understood as discourse-dialogue 
between defenders of finite positions who recognize 
that that is what they are and who shun the temptation 
to impose their position on others illegitimately 
(through validation by first principles). (Vattimo, 2004, 
46) 
Note, here, that Vattimo hints at the better interpretation in stating that the agent is to 
seek that heritage to which he or she is ‘truly’ obliged.  That tradition is liberalism of 
the sort that encourages free thinking: one realizes that one’s values are grounded in 
an interpretation of reality, but an interpretation is not mere fiction nor 
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inconsequential, but one truth amongst many.  When the dichotomy of truth and the 
expression of interests is deconstructed, one is left with neither truth nor fiction and 
the raising up of the epistemic status of political values and the levelling down of the 
epistemic status of comprehensive values leads to a coincidence in their weight.  
Vattimo talks explicitly of a responsible interpretation of one’s own moral fabric with 
all its inherent values and the recognition that such values derive from a worldview 
and not from incontrovertible, absolute truth.  And the values which are to be 
preferred are those which – although derived from a particular tradition – are judged 
by the criteria of tolerance (the reduction of violence) and consensus (the recognition 
that agreement is not grounded in the legitimacy of one comprehensive doctrine over 
another, but in the recognition of the finitude of one’s own and the other’s position).  
The schizophrenic Kantian psychology which haunts Rawls’s position even in 
Political Liberalism can now be replaced by a horizontal embedded self produced by 
the value pluralism of contemporary society and regulated by the primacy of the 
practical (political and ethical) commitment to free thinking.  Vattimo would defend 
the primacy of practical over theoretical reason since tolerance becomes a necessary 
attitude of the philosopher if he or she is to be sincere.  Otherwise, his or her 
assertions would be prejudiced, partial or dogmatic. (Vattimo, 2004, ch. 8)  If one is 
to engage in reflection and thinking, then one must suspend judgement on assertions 
until such time that their refusal or rejection is incontrovertible and that means the 
thinker who does not is not committed to reason.  This is the primacy of practical over 
theoretical reason and, perhaps not so oddly anymore, Jean Hampton’s criticism of 
Rawls, which centres on his separation of the political from the metaphysical, offers a 
conclusion which is very reminiscent.  Respect, for her, is both a philosophical and a 
political commitment in the face of anti-modern fundamentalism, obedience to 
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authority and violence in dialogue: ‘Such respect is the foundation not only of 
philosophy but also of liberal society; it is that upon which we must insist if we wish 
to have either.  One who is committed to philosophy must also be committed to 
remaining intolerant of others’ intolerance.  To attempt to reach consensus with 
intolerant true believers would be to betray one’s belief in the respect that grounds 
one’s very philosophizing.’  (Hampton, 1989, 812) 
 
Furthermore, the ethics of interpretation offers its own version of Rawls’s political-
comprehensive distinction, even if it is not named.  The subject is an historical 
product immediately motivated by the comprehensive values of his tradition which 
are true if they cohere with the standard of rationality of that tradition.  Yet, the 
hermeneutic subject is more: reason is no longer adherence to the principles which 
originate from a worldview, but the rationality of an open dialogue between versions 
of truth in order to garner agreement and reduce violence.  On the one hand, one is 
committed to consistency; on the other, one is committed to consensus.  For this 
hermeneutic truth, the embedded subject must also be committed to certain 
preconditions that make free and transparent dialogue possible and also rule out the 
violence of metaphysics.  The precondition holds that a doctrine has the right to be 
expressed in dialogue if it meets the criteria of respect and tolerance and is aimed at 
consensus.  These are the same conditions, more or less, that a doctrine must meet to 
be considered reasonable and form an overlapping consensus with other doctrines, but 
instead of either a genealogical justification or one based in Kantian psychology, the 
justification is that a doctrine must be an example of free thinking. 
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So, it seems that Vattimo is claiming that respect, tolerance, liberty and equality are 
normative commitments for the subject who inhabits the fabric of contemporary  
society.  The normative commitments of an ethics of interpretation coincide with the 
values of political liberalism and, moreover, explain why the political is privileged 
over and above the comprehensive as it supplies a rational basis – acceptable to all – 
for inter-cultural dialogue.  These values are ethical and necessary in order to produce 
the subject who can offer a responsible interpretation.  Such a subject is not a 
knowing subject which would test strong truth; that is, the correspondence of an 
object to its conditions of being experienced.  The hermeneutic subject is ethical 
because the norms which oblige him or her should guarantee the absence of violence: 
one must be able to step back, that is not be coerced or irrevocably bound to one’s 
tradition (liberty), one must recognize the finitude of one’s position and that of others 
(tolerance) and one must recognize the right of all individuals to their own 
responsibly articulated and interpreted tradition (equality and respect). 
 
The hermeneutic values of the ethics of interpretation and political liberalism coincide 
and the substantive commitment of the ethics of interpretation with its implicit 
endorsement of the social thesis better explains why political values trump 
comprehensive values in cases of conflict.  The concern remains, however, that this 
approach has ceded too much and political liberalism and its values are relevant only 
to a specific society, that is the society characterized by value pluralism.  The 
challenge is to be able to state, in no uncertain terms, that certain ways of life are 
better than others and certain social practices are universally wrong. 
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It seems that Rawls and Vattimo are both committed to the autonomy of the subject 
and its liberation, even if such a liberation is no longer a matter of the imposition of 
universal reason. (Freeman, 2007, 361-3)  The postmodern condition is, peculiarly 
and surprisingly, a commitment to the universality not of individual reason but of 
social dialogue.  Vattimo affirms an implicit postmodern normativity that inverts 
Rawls:  
The task of philosophy, once it is aware of the 
postmodern condition, consists in articulating this pre-
comprehension; attempting, or better inventing, starting 
from this very condition (projecting) a guiding thread 
for choices and plans, from individual ethics to politics.  
In place of the nostalgic effort, characteristic of reactive 
nihilism, to go back to ‘values’, it is a question of 
actively continuing the ‘active nihilistic’ work of the 
destruction of absolutes.  For what reason?  For an 
individual ethics or a political society explicitly 
grounded in the free choice of that which, of course 
always starting from the path where we already find 
ourselves, most certainly appears capable of liberating 
us from idols… (Vattimo, 2007, 37) 
The subject must begin from the comprehensive and move towards the political, that 
is move from individual ethics to political values, and not vice versa.  For Rawls, we 
had to begin from the original position and then impose its conditions, slowly and 
stage by stage, on comprehensive commitments.  The overriding norm for Vattimo is 
liberation from idols, from superstition, that is not from beliefs simply understood as 
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false, but specifically from those beliefs used for political manipulation.  The 
reflective and secular nature of our society is universally desirable.  The privilege of 
liberal values does not lie in moral realism (Rawls and Vattimo agree on this), but in a 
commitment to one substantial good: the political freedom to makes one’s own 
choice.  The commitment has different sources: for Rawls it is radical empiricism and 
the belief that comprehensive doctrines have been wrong in the past and are more than 
likely still in error; for Vattimo, there is no one truth or way of life which is 
intrinsically, universally better than them all.  Oddly, both commit one to a form of 
life that allows all interests to be expressed and considered with respect.  That is, a 
liberal form of life.   
Conclusion 
Vattimo and Rawls both agree that the aim of political dialogue is consensus and 
coherence but not truth, implicitly insisting on the notion of the other as a respected 
participant in discourse unless he or she is unreasonable.  The values that make 
possible a sincere interpretation of others and oneself regulate one’s comportment to 
others and coincide neatly with the values of political liberalism.  Such values can be 
derived, bottom-up, from the social and moral fabric of postmodern culture.  Rawls’s 
political liberalism is top-down: it imposes the values of liberalism on pluralism in 
order to resolve conflict; whereas Vattimo’s ethics of interpretation is bottom-up: it 
posits the values of political liberalism as the consequence of the multiplication of 
worldviews.  For both, the values of political liberalism are universal because they 
make possible a mature, reflective society which has developed to the level where it is 
confident enough to put into question its own beliefs and values in the face of 
dialogue with the other.5  Such an exercise of practical wisdom is an opening up of 
possibilities and the opportunity to discuss, freely and openly with the other.   
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Vattimo is, however, perhaps too conservative: the agent's first obligation is to the 
tradition from which he speaks and, at times, his position is in danger of being 
nothing but a sociological description of postmodern society rather than a normative 
prescription of certain ethical values.  The subject for Vattimo must listen to his 
tradition and be responsible in his interpretation of it, yet the values conferred on him 
or her cannot play the role of legitimation in a plural society.  However, if Vattimo is 
guilty of making the political sphere too comprehensive, then Rawls is guilty of the 
opposite: his values run the risk of becoming purely formal and only substantive if 
they happen to coincide with particular comprehensive commitments of the agent, 
thus raising serious concerns over one’s allegiance to the political order in cases of 
conflict.  The avowal of the social thesis and the affirmation of the postmodern 
substratum have this advantage over Rawls’s presentation of political liberalism: the 
normative values which determine one’s conversation with the other are aimed at 
consensual agreement on values that are shared and equally intelligible.  Respect, 
tolerance and liberty are the substantial account of the good which constitutes 
postmodern society and therefore one can see how the political values will trump the 
comprehensive values in cases of conflict if one is sincerely engaged in conversation.  
Conversely, Rawls’s own formal rationalism is required by any contextual politics 
since, by divorcing the political subject who – in a sense – is autonomous and 
privileged in the activity of political discourse from the particular subject, he ensures 
that the social thesis does not undermine the normative aims of dialogue and refuses 
blind obedience to authority. 
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1
 For reasons of economy of space, I make reference to the most relevant pieces of the 
enormous secondary material on Rawls.  Rather cheekily, however, I direct the reader 
to the fantastic bibliography in Freeman (2007, 515-35), especially the section entitled 
‘political liberalism’ and also to the discussions and suggestions for further reading in 
Mulhall & Swift (1996). 
2
 For a discussion of the use of ‘pro tanto’ here, please refer back to §1. 
3
 The inadequate mention of ‘stability for the right reasons’ does not do sufficient 
justice to the subtlety of Rawls’s own rather complex thinking on this issue.  For more 
thorough and elaborate discussion, the reader ought to refer to Freeman (2007, ch. 8) 
and also Barry (1995). 
4
 Postmodern thought characterized thus is, then, the target of Hegel’s criticism of 
post-Kantian arbitrariness. (Hegel, 1991, §140). 
5
 The position is very similar to the one reached by MacIntyre. (1988, ch. 18) 
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